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 Who Is Truly Responsible for the Floods?

In August, heavy rainfall simultaneously struck Northeast India, Tripura, Assam, and Meghalaya. This resulted in water overflow from hydropower plants, barrages, and dams. In Bangladesh, the upstream flow reached dangerous levels at 14 points across seven transboundary rivers, causing many flood-control dams, including the one on the Gomati River, to collapse. Areas such as Feni, Cumilla, Noakhali, Khagrachhari, Habiganj, Chandpur, Cox's Bazar, Munshiganj, Sylhet, Lakshmipur, Chattogram, and Brahmanbaria experienced flooding. This disaster claimed 20 lives and affected over five million people.

This event has sparked debate over whether the floods were caused by natural factors or political decisions. However, such a dichotomy is misguided, as disasters often involve both natural and political elements.

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The primary cause of the August floods was excessive rainfall over a short period. Similar floods have recently occurred in Sylhet, Sunamganj, Bandarban, and even Dubai. Climatologists attribute these floods to climate change-induced excessive rainfall and meteorological droughts. Global warming, driven largely by the fossil fuel-dependent economies of wealthy nations, exacerbates the climate crisis.

The connection between the August floods and the climate crisis is inherently political. Floods are influenced by global climate politics, including decisions by India to open the gates of power plants, dams, and barrages. Additionally, unresolved river management issues between India and Bangladesh are part of this political landscape.

Recent floods have highlighted a broader issue: the natural pathways for water flow have been diminished over time. Rivers and wetlands have been filled in, and many canals have disappeared, leading to widespread inundation as floodwater has fewer places to go.

 A Crisis of Prediction and Preparedness?

Questions about disaster forecasting and preparedness have long been raised. Often, there is a lack of will and accountability in providing timely forecasts and warnings. The traditional practice of citizen forecasting—analyzing natural signs such as cloud patterns and wind speed—has diminished, and the state has largely ignored this local knowledge.

Currently, forecasts from the Meteorological Department are the main source of information, but these forecasts are not always uniformly applied or understood across different regions. For instance, a "danger signal-10" might have different implications in coastal areas compared to haors or hilly regions. The absence of effective warnings for areas affected by hilly runoff or droughts is also notable. The Meteorological Department's inclusion under the defense ministry reflects the perception of forecasting as a "defense" concern.

Since Cyclone Sidr in 2007, cyclonic forecasts have been regularly broadcasted. The structure of disaster preparedness improved after Cyclone Aila in 2009. While traditional media and local announcements remain important, online platforms and social media now play a significant role in cyclone warnings. Independent meteorologists and organizations also contribute forecasts.

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However, disaster preparedness varies widely. The coastal areas, particularly in the Satkhira-Khulna region, have developed a robust culture of preparedness. In contrast, other regions, like the haors in Sunamganj and the north, are less prepared. Floods in August are a new phenomenon for areas like Feni, Noakhali, Khagrachhari, and Cumilla.

Was There No Prediction or Warning?

Indeed, there were predictions. The Meteorological Department forecasted short-term floods in early August, attributing them to heavy monsoon rains. The Flood Forecasting and Warning Centre of the Water Development Board indicated that the waters of seven transboundary rivers were above danger levels. The outgoing head of state also warned of potential floods in early July. The South Asian Climate Outlook Forum had predicted floods as early as April.

Despite these warnings, preparations were inadequate. The current government faced a rapid sequence of events following the July uprising, leaving little time for preparation. Additionally, India delayed in providing comprehensive advance warnings, breaching prior commitments.

Transboundary River Governance

In 2005, the haor problem was identified as a transboundary issue, but it did not gain substantial momentum. Concerns about the Farakka barrage, Teesta water sharing, and the Tipaimukh dam were prevalent.

I have explored the transboundary issues by visiting river-basin towns in Bangladesh and Northeast India and have written extensively about the impacts of upstream dams, hydropower projects, and deforestation. Despite the evidence, anti-India protests over floods have not emerged.

According to the National River Conservation Commission's 2023 report, Bangladesh has 1,008 rivers, with 57 identified as common transboundary rivers. Many of these originate in India. India's construction of dams and hydroelectric projects often disrupts these rivers, leading to severe consequences for downstream Bangladesh and upstream areas.

This situation contradicts international agreements on transboundary river management. The Bangladesh-India Joint River Commission, formed in 1972, has not resolved all issues regarding inter-state rivers. The 1996 Ganga Water Sharing Treaty mandates equitable river management, and the 1992 UN Convention on Biological Diversity prohibits actions endangering neighboring countries' biodiversity. Despite these agreements, timely flood notifications, as decided in the 2022 Joint River Commission meeting, have not been adequately communicated, leaving communities unprepared.